Thermonuclear propaganda: presentations of nuclear strategy in the early atomic age by Harrington, Brian M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-06
Thermonuclear propaganda:
presentations of nuclear strategy in the
early atomic age
Harrington, Brian M.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THERMONUCLEAR PROPAGANDA: PRESENTATIONS 









Thesis Advisor:  Donald Abenheim 
Co-Advisor: Carolyn Halladay 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
THERMONUCLEAR PROPAGANDA: PRESENTATIONS OF NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY IN THE EARLY ATOMIC AGE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Brian M. Harrington 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES he views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
As the image of the thermonuclear apocalypse loomed over the early years of the Cold War and technological 
advancements brought the possibility of such a fate closer to reality, the U.S.-Soviet conflict became increasingly a 
battle for hearts and minds—on the home front as well as among allied populations. However, public diplomacy in a 
democracy is more complicated than a public relations campaign, for actions often trump words, particularly in the 
case of nuclear strategy. 
 
This thesis examines the aims of policy, strategy, and mass persuasion and its civil-military character as manifested in 
the atomic public diplomacy in the Cold War until the 1980s, but especially of the “classical” period, 1940s–1960s. 
Specifically, it studies public presentation of nuclear issues through three media: U.S. television, the Soviet peace 
offensive, and official communiqués of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
 
In each example, leaders sought to shape citizens’ views on warfare in order to garner the support necessary to carry 
out an expensive strategy that required tremendous faith from the political public. These three examples shed light on 
the importance of mass politics in the creation and implementation of strategy in an era of high tension and rapid 





14. SUBJECT TERMS Nuclear, atomic, mass communications, propaganda, public diplomacy, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Soviet, United States, Europe,  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THERMONUCLEAR PROPAGANDA: PRESENTATIONS OF NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY IN THE EARLY ATOMIC AGE 
 
 
Brian M. Harrington 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of Virginia, 2005 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed Hafez,  
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




As the image of the thermonuclear apocalypse loomed over the early years of the Cold 
War and technological advancements brought the possibility of such a fate closer to 
reality, the U.S.-Soviet conflict became increasingly a battle for hearts and minds—on 
the home front as well as among allied populations. However, public diplomacy in a 
democracy is more complicated than a public relations campaign, for actions often trump 
words, particularly in the case of nuclear strategy. 
This thesis examines the aims of policy, strategy, and mass persuasion and its 
civil-military character as manifested in the atomic public diplomacy in the Cold War 
until the 1980s, but especially of the “classical” period, 1940s–1960s. Specifically, it 
studies public presentation of nuclear issues through three media: U.S. television, the 
Soviet peace offensive, and official communiqués of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  
In each example, leaders sought to shape citizens’ views on warfare in order to 
garner the support necessary to carry out an expensive strategy that required tremendous 
faith from the political public. These three examples shed light on the importance of mass 
politics in the creation and implementation of strategy in an era of high tension and rapid 
technological innovation.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. SHADOW OF THE BOMB ........................................................................................1 
A. THEORIZING NUCLEAR WARFARE .......................................................2 
B. THREE THEMES ...........................................................................................3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
1. Propaganda and Democracy ...............................................................5 
2. Atomic Culture .....................................................................................6 
D. OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................9 
II. A BOMB IN EVERY HOME: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE 
ON AMERICAN TELEVISION ..............................................................................13 
A. IN THE BEGINNING: FUN WITH ATOMS .............................................14 
B. MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BOMB ...............................16 
C. THE BIG PICTURE ......................................................................................19 
D. THE NEW LOOK..........................................................................................21 
E. THE BIG PICTURE IN THE 1960S ............................................................24 
F. WINNING THE NUCLEAR WAR WITH VIGILANCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................................27 
III. OLIVE BRANCHES AND ICBMS: THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE ........31 
A. PROPAGANDA AND THE SOVIET STATE ............................................32 
B. PEACEFUL PROPAGANDA AND NUCLEAR BLUSTER: 1949–
1962..................................................................................................................35 
C. REACHING STRATEGIC PARITY ...........................................................42 
D. CONCLUSION: ATOMIC PROPAGANDA AND RUSSIAN 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ................................................................................44 
IV. UNITED FRONT: OFFICIAL NATO COMMUNIQUÉS ON NUCLEAR 
ISSUES, 1949–1969 ....................................................................................................47 
A. INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION: 1949–1962 ...............................48 
B. BACK FROM THE ABYSS: NATO COMMUNIQUÉS 1963–1970 ........56 
C. NATO COMMUNIQUÉS AS PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS OF 
NUCLEAR STRATEGY ...............................................................................58 
V. STRADDLING THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE: WINNING NUCLEAR 
CONFLICT WITH IDEAS .......................................................................................63 
A. MOBILIZING THE MASSES: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
STRATEGY....................................................................................................63 
B. THE VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE ....................................................65 
C. IDEOLOGY AND THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE ............................65 
D. TECHNOLOGY OR STRATEGY: CHALLENGES IN THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF WARFARE ..................................................................68 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................81 
 viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
APN Novosti Press Agency 
BMD ballistic missile defense 
DOD Department of Defense 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile  
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty 
IO Information Operations 
MAD mutually assured destruction  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Non Proliferation Treaty 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
TASS Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union 









I am indebted to the United States Navy and the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate 
School for the opportunity to develop as a leader and scholar. I could not have completed 
this project without the steadfast guidance from my advisors, Dr. Carolyn Halladay and 
Dr. Donald Abenheim. They inspired my studies and fostered my growth as an officer 
and an intellectual. I am also grateful for Dr. Clay Moltz, Dr. Misha Tsypkin, and Dr. 
David Yost for providing encouragement to better understand often abstruse ideas.  
Foremost, I would like to thank my family for providing the foundation for any 
successes I have thus far achieved. To my beloved wife, Laura, thank you for your 
unconditional support of this and all endeavors I undertake. To my parents, Barbara and 
Michael—as well as the rest of my family—I thank you for my inquisitiveness and 
determination, without which I would be lost. 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. SHADOW OF THE BOMB 
In 1955, NATO, with its tactical air forces, undertook a major field exercise of the 
new doctrine of massive retaliation. The event transpired in a young West Germany, just 
emerging from the wreckage of war as a new NATO member, and the much-touted event 
saw the fighter bombers of the U.S. Air Force and other Atlantic allies swoop into action 
over northern and southern Germany. This exercise simulated the dropping of dozens of 
nuclear weapons on an imaginary enemy, as well as collateral damage to the population 
of the Federal Republic of Germany—to the tune of millions of irradiated, vaporized, and 
otherwise atomically dead West Germans. The popular backlash was swift, and the event 
helped give birth to the anti-nuclear movement in central Europe that continues to shape 
trans-Atlantic relations into the year 2014 in the face of the crisis in the Ukraine with a 
resurgent Russia. Nonetheless, NATO and its nuclear weapons as well as its alliance of 
values and burdens live on today in the shadow of Russian aggression in Crimea—in part 
because of enduring power and rhetoric of the message of a united West. How did NATO 
mass persuasion and propaganda square the circle of the transformed face of war amid 
subject populations lodged between the devil and the deep blue sea of collective defense 
and horrifying mass atomic death in the early nuclear age? 
This thesis examines the aims of policy and strategy and mass persuasion of the 
trans-Atlantic alliance and its civil-military character as manifested in the atomic public 
diplomacy in the Cold War until the 1980s, and especially of the “classical” period, the 
1940s through the 1960s. These aims changed as the threat of thermonuclear war 
expanded in the phases of the Cold War and its advances of weapons technology and 
nuclear crises, whereby the atomic bomb gave way to the hydrogen bomb, as well as the 
advent of brush-fire wars, missile crises, and the lurid episodes of the Cold War, which 
seemed to usher in the destruction of all that was to be defended by a policy of nuclear 
deterrence against an implacable and aggressive foe.  
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A. THEORIZING NUCLEAR WARFARE 
Soldiers in the higher echelons of command over the last century have become 
obsessed with popular will and the elements of anger and hatred, that is, morale and its 
tendency in their minds to collapse in crisis as the prelude to the stab in the back. The 
role of technology as the measure of all things great and small has exacerbated this 
syndrome of fears about morale in conflict. Since September 11, drones and automated 
technology have become central features of conflict, and the impact of this technology on 
perceptions of warfare begs for further interpretation. Such an interpretation, however, 
must rely on the record of an earlier time in Europe and the United States to provide a 
comparison. Likewise the ideology of the current conflict is not completely dissimilar 
from that of the Cold War in which winning populations was no less of a challenge than 
defeating violent foes. This thesis seeks to add precision to this comparison via an 
examination of the character, use, and evolution of nuclear public diplomacy in Europe 
and the United States of the Cold War.  
Carl Von Clausewitz published his epic On War almost two centuries ago.
1
 
Despite the technological advances and the creation of a world where “the whole 
character of war as a means of settling differences has been transformed beyond all 
recognition,”2 his work remains extremely important in understanding warfare. 
Clausewitz’s observations were rooted in both personal experiences with the title topic 
and extensive historical observation; he “knew that war is not a pleasant affair,” and 
offers unprecedented insight “to understand basically what war is all about, on its various 
levels of commitment and of violence.”3  
This perspective is decidedly different from much of the dominant theory 
produced since the advent of the Atomic Age. In the absence of facts and experience on 
which to base concepts of thermonuclear warfare, theory has had considerable reign since 
                                                 
1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War: Indexed Edition, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63. 
2 Bernard Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” in On War, edited and translated by 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 49. 
3 Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” 48. 
 3 
the use of even one H-bomb would have entailed suffering and destruction on an 
unimaginable scale, even with the memories and wounds of the world wars so fresh. 
Furthermore, nuclear strategy based on game theory, mathematical calculation and other 
analytical methods frequently gloss over Clausewitz’s timeless concept “that war in all its 
phases must be rationally guided by meaningful political purpose.”4 How has the 
dominance of nuclear theory shaped views of warfare on both sides of the Atlantic?  
B. THREE THEMES 
Americans in the 20th century did not experience the horrors of total war on their 
own soil as was the case in Europe and Asia. The possibility of thermonuclear warfare 
and destruction of American cities was a concept not easily accepted or understood by 
American citizens. Still, the growing civil-military society of the United States of the 
epoch of total war in the 20th century took responsibility for educating its population and 
ensuring they were behind its agenda. Europe was poised to be the site of an east-west 
conflict for the third time in less than a century—this time with nuclear weapons. 
However, the reality of warfare struck much closer to home for survivors of the era of 
total warfare. Evidence of previous conflicts was a part of everyday life. Those who lived 
through the realities of the era of total war were much closer to the facts of war, whereas 
those removed from such experience must live based on theory. How did strategists 
address these vastly different populations during the Cold War?  
There are three themes that reveal themselves upon closer inspection of the state-
produced media from this era. First, Department of Defense and civil defense programs 
reflect the desire held by many American’s to turn war, an inherently dirty business, into 
a somehow cleaner one. This misconception ignores Clausewitz’s fog of war and has led 
to Americans substituting technology for strategy, the second theme present in the 
propaganda of this period. Americans’ faith in technological superiority is epitomized by 
the nuclearization of the military in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the propaganda of this 
period reflects Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy dialectic made famous in his tract of the late 
                                                 
4 Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War,” 51, 45. 
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Weimar Republic but which speaks to other periods of the state of the exception and of 
democracy in crisis because of ideological conflict. The concept of all compromises as 
temporary in Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political and the necessity of identifying 
friend and enemy as essential to one’s human existence are reflected by the Cold War as 
an ideological struggle between two belief systems where war, in many people’s mind, 
was inevitable.
5
 The message presented to the American people was that preparations 
must be made to successfully fight and win a thermonuclear conflict with the Soviets.  
One of the first steps for such an outcome was for the war to take place elsewhere, 
namely Europe. This development entailed a vastly different perspective on both sides of 
the Atlantic, despite the idea that NATO rested on a foundation of common values. 
Soldiers and civilians alike adjusted their concepts of policy, strategy, and military 
posture to fit the changing face of war with high technology while balancing restive and 
dissenting populations who looked upon the demands of nuclear deterrence as an exercise 
in madness and a fundamental imbalance of ends and means. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Propaganda played a central role in the European era of total war in the 20th 
century. In the Cold War, the doctrines of mass politics, the atomic bomb and ideological 
stalemate loomed over European society in the form of nuclear propaganda on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain from 1948 until 1989. State-produced media of mass persuasion in 
this period portrayed the possibility of thermonuclear war in such a way which fostered 
support for a strategy increasingly dependent on nuclear technology and a militarization 
of democratic citizens. This portrayal reflects the civil-military agenda of the time as well 
as deeper realities about war, society, culture, the depiction of armed conflict and the role 
of the citizen in such conflict.  
                                                 
5 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 26, 66. 
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1. Propaganda and Democracy 
Various schools of thought struggle to explain “how a society aspiring to 
democracy may balance the right to persuade with the right of the public to free choice.”6 
J. Michael Sproule provides a survey of the subject in Propaganda and Democracy, 
exploring the evolving scholarship on the topic from the era of total war through the end 
of the Cold War.  
Progressive studies of propaganda serve as a guard against “ivory tower 
thinking,” by exposing overly aggressive attempts by elites to persuade mass support of 
agendas based on incomplete information.
7
 This school of thought grew from American 
muckraking that emerged in WWI and gained momentum with the unpopular Vietnam 
War and the Watergate scandal. This line of scholarly work tends to analyze events in 
which those possessing greater control of media outlets overstep perceived limits of 
democracy and rally support for specific ends by controlling the flow of information to 
the public. Public relations great Edward Bernays noted the importance of manipulation 
of the masses in democratic society and warned in the 1920s that “those who manipulate 
this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true 
ruling power of our country.”8 History presents numerous examples where such means 
have devastated societies. The rise of aggressive nationalism leading up to the outbreak 
of World War I, the propaganda machine of Nazi Germany, and the early popular support 
of the Vietnam War as an extension of the ideological conflict of the Cold War serve as 
prominent examples in which progressive historians cite the destructive potential of 
propaganda. The progressive view has tones of a Marxist interpretation of history in 
which democratic societies must be weary of those in control of information.9  
                                                 
6 J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass 
Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 271. 
7 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 270, 271. 
8 Edward Bernays, Propaganda: With an Introduction by Mark Crispin Miller (New York: Ig , 2005), 
37. 
9 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the 
Present Day, 3rd ed. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 266-77; Susan L. Carruthers, The 
Media at War, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 32–39, 264. 
 6 
The counterpoint to anti-propaganda progressive critique is offered by 
communication practitioners who present a more neutral view of propaganda in which the 
effectiveness of the subject is questioned. This school of thought attempts to determine 
the methods by which communications are leveraged to steer the public for socially 
productive or destructive ends.
10
 This approach has filled some of the gaps left by a 
progressive view but is limited in its’ ability to measure social influence of various 
methods of propaganda.
11
 This view also includes a critique of propaganda but from a 
“liberal bias” perspective of the media. Although this school of thought shares with the 
progressive view apprehension in trusting information presented to society, the body in 
question is the media industry rather than the state.
12
  
2. Atomic Culture 
One of the first scholars to permeate popular culture thinking about the nuclear 
age was Herman Kahn. Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War and Thinking the Unthinkable 
brought discussions of thermonuclear war to the public sphere. Ultimately, Kahn argues 
for the necessity to discuss and plan for the possibility of such a conflict so that it may be 
possible to “fight, survive, and win a thermonuclear war.”13 Kahn and all nuclear 
strategists are forced to acknowledge that “the outcome of decisions that are well-
meaning, informed and intelligent can be disastrous. However, few would argue that this 
is a good reason to be malevolent, ignorant, or stupid. We have to do the best we can with 
the tools and abilities we have.”14  
Numerous scholars have looked back on the Cold War and attempted to discern 
the cultural impact of living in the shadow of thermonuclear war. Paul Boyer believes 
that there were three distinct periods when this impact was most acute: 1945–1948 
                                                 
10 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 270. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 175–85; Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 266; Taylor, Munitions of 
the Mind, 266–77. 
13 Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 59. 
14 Ibid., 254. 
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following the end of WWII and the introduction of the atomic bomb; 1954–1963, when 
testing was at its height and fallout was a household subject; and a revitalized anti-
nuclear surge during Reagan’s first term.15 Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove expresses 
many of the popular fears of the arms race and deterrence from this second period in a 
dark comedy about nuclear apocalypse due to automated controls, ego-driven military 
leaders, and miscommunications between Soviet and American leaders.
16
 Dr. Strangelove 
remains a classic to students of the atomic era, but it only represents part of the atomic 
culture. Atomic Culture: How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb plays on 
the subtitle of the iconic film but explores numerous peculiar aspects of this era including 
atomic board games, Ms. Atom Bomb pageants, atomic kitsch and atomic comics.17 One 
scholar of atomic culture noted the ambiguity of the duality of the atomic age as a central 
tenant to building the “most powerful of all modern myths,”18 while the “necessity of 
preventing another Hiroshima and Nagasaki”19 was also a theme present in the majority 
of these early depictions of atomic culture. 
Much of the scholarly work on atomic culture focuses on the dangers of 
thermonuclear warfare, the irresponsible and hawkish behavior of many bureaucratic and 
military decision makers, and their often foolishly portrayed efforts to rally support for 
atomic programs. The civil defense program is one such topic. The timeless Duck and 
Cover film impacted generations of American citizens, but civil defense programs 
remained a “speculative and somewhat fanciful idea that never really caught on in the  
 
 
                                                 
15 Paul Boyer, Fallout: America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus, OH: 
Ohio State University Press, 1998), 95. 
16 Boyer, Fallout, 95–102. 
17 Scott C. Zeman and Michael A. Amundson, Atomic Bomb: How we Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Bomb (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2004). 
18 Ferenc Morton Szasz, Atomic Comics: Cartoonists Confront the Nuclear World (Reno, NV: 
University of Nevada Press, 2012), 135. 
19 Ibid., 136. 
 8 
United States.”20  Ultimately, much of the literature on atomic culture praises antinuclear 
activists as “the last best hope for the future” in promoting a “more reasonable 
approach.”21 
Total Cold War by Kenneth Osgood offers a study of propaganda specific to the 
Eisenhower administration in the formative years of the Cold War and pays particular 
attention to the balance between Eisenhower’s information campaign and his New Look 
for nuclear strategy. Eisenhower respected and utilized psychological warfare and 
information as a formidable weapon during WWII and continued to do so as president. 
Under his direct guidance, “from the highest levels of the national security establishment 
to the remotest diplomatic outposts abroad, political warfare became the organizing 
concept for American foreign policy.”22  
A major aspect of this strategy was “managing domestic and international 
perceptions of the nuclear danger.”23 As Eisenhower’s New Look pushed nuclear 
weapons to center stage and the catastrophic potential of thermonuclear war grew with 
rapidly improving technology, the president countered popular fears with the Atoms for 
Peace campaign. This effort helped satisfy “a psychological need to find something 
redeeming and worthwhile” in the technology and helped “propagate a friendly atomic 
discourse to rival the apocalyptic discourse that had characterized most discussions of the 
atom.”24 Osgood does not focus on nuclear optimism or pessimism, but rather gives much 




                                                 
20 Allan M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 135. 
21 Ibid., 214. 
22 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 78. 
23 Ibid., 154. 
24 Ibid., 180. 
25 Ibid., 155.  
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D. OVERVIEW 
The technological advancements of the 1950s and 1960s, coupled with the 
polarization of the Cold War, pushed capabilities for thermonuclear warfare to the center 
of strategy. This development of an ideological conflict under the shadow of “the bomb” 
forced the Soviets and the West alike to wage a massive propaganda war.
26
 Building on 
the scholarship already in place about the cultural impact of living in the shadow of 
thermonuclear war, this thesis is conceived as a historical study of the message presented 
to Western citizens by the state. The evidence and illustration comes from a comparison 
of three mediums of public diplomacy by three different actors in the Cold War era. 
The era under study was defined not just by the advent and rise of nuclear 
weapons, but also by a communications revolution in which the medium of television 
was increasingly the main source by which Americans received information. As such, the 
first area of study focuses on film and television propaganda related to nuclear 
armaments. At the center of this study are such contemporary programs as The Big 
Picture. The Big Picture was a television series produced by the Department of Defense, 
presenting half-hour segments about various military capabilities and situations during 
the Cold War era. The program ran from 1950 to 1975 and aired on more than 300 
television stations nationwide.
27
 This chapter demonstrates how this and other state 




While the West fought to ease anxieties over thermonuclear war and garner 
support for nuclear strategy, the Soviets also faced challenges in the realm of propaganda 
and public diplomacy. The Peace Offensive launched by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s 
and the idea of peaceful coexistence conflicted with U.S. intentions of convincing a 
democratic audience of the necessity of building a military and an Alliance armed with 
                                                 
 26 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, 213. 
27 The Big Picture, United States Army, 1950–1975, National Archives online public access, ARC ID 
36952, Local ID TV-111: Records of the Office of the Chief of the Army Signal Corps 1860–1985, last 
accessed June 2014. http://research.archives.gov/description/36952.  
 28 Osgood, Total Cold War; Szasz, Atomic Comics; Zeman and Amundson, Atomic Culture, 3-4. 
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the most modern nuclear technology. The Soviet propaganda machine attempted to 
disrupt technological advancements and defense spending in the United States, gain 
sympathy from third world states, support regimes similar to the Soviet model, and 
increase tensions within NATO. By reviewing the Soviet efforts to influence Western 
perspectives on nuclear arms, one can ground the analysis of American leaders’ message 
to its own citizens.  
The European audience of the 1950s was all too familiar with the realities of war. 
From 1914 to 1945, Europe witnessed more than 35 million war-related deaths, the 
majority of which were civilians.
29
 The era of total war left its mark on a generation of 
Europeans where almost everyone had lost a relative, friend, or neighbor and “many 
never recovered from the pain of loss.”30 As a result, mourning was “endless, eternal.”31 
Furthermore, a war waged between the growing superpowers of the United States the 
Soviet Union would most likely take place on the blood soaked lands of continental 
Europe. This was the audience NATO addressed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The European audience received messages from both American and Soviet media 
vying to win the battle for hearts and minds. Radio Free Europe was one overt method of 
spreading a pro-West message. The Hollywood movie industry was another source that 
reached viewers across the Atlantic. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Hollywood 
declared “full-scale war on international communism,”32 which evolved into a positive 
propaganda message in the mid-1950s, and finally into a pro-détente message by the 
early 1960s.
33
 However, there still remained the need for official statements, platforms, 
                                                 
 29 Daniel Moran, “World War II Casualties” and “Armed Forces Casualties: 1914-1918,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, NS3000, last accessed 18 February, 2014. 
https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/6fe57197-ef32-4653-8d7c-
1cd0c9c1c47d/06b%20World%20Wars%20Casualties.pdf. 
 30 Stéphane Audoin-Rouseau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2000), 225. Although the essay is an assessment of World War I mourning, it is also 
applicable to the sense of loss felt throughout Europe following World War II. 
31 Ibid. 
 32 Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for 
Hearts and Minds (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 19. 
33 Ibid., 18. 
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and declared strategy to avoid misperceptions at the highest echelon which could lead to 
truly disastrous consequences. The official NATO communiqués of the era in question 
serve as a third avenue of public diplomacy. Unique in their status as official messages 
from a multinational organization, these documents also demonstrate the insecurities 
present with those living in what would most likely have been ground zero for a violent 
showdown between the Soviets and the Americans. In this environment of competing 
ideologies, the NATO communiqués played a unique role in public diplomacy as a united 
message from the Alliance and demonstrate yet another medium by which strategy can be 
presented to the masses. 
The present analysis interprets these sources through three lenses. First, 
perceptions of the role of citizens and the military in democratic societies during war and 
the cultural interpretation of these roles are explored. This thesis also adds to 
understanding of the media as a reflection of the gap between American views of war and 
war in reality. This analysis is framed by Clausewitz. The third framework is the 
ideological and cultural implications of the Cold War as seen in the various mediums and 
will be framed by Carl Schmidt’s friend-enemy dialectic and his Concept of the Political. 
In the concluding chapter, these themes are related to contemporary perceptions of war, 
the ideological struggle of the War on Terror, and the overdependence on technology as a 
substitute for strategy. 
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II. A BOMB IN EVERY HOME: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR 
WARFARE ON AMERICAN TELEVISION 
In 1946, the United States was the only nation in possession of the atomic bomb, 
though it seemed only a matter of time before Russia acquired a weapon of its own, 
making “our security and that of all countries which today may be able to count on our 
protection far more precarious.”34 With such a development, U.S. policymakers feared, 
the war-ravaged West might suffer a relapse of “those attitudes which so often in the past 
have destroyed friendship and confidence between the nations of Europe.”35 Not just the 
superpowers but their European allies and dependencies well might “begin lining up for 
another world war,”36 for “as the tension between them rises or falls, so will the fear 
which the atomic weapon has put into the hearts of men increase or decline.”37  
When in 1949 the first Soviet nuclear test heralded the dawn of the Atomic Age, 
the citizens of today had to be prepared—if not mobilized—for the war of tomorrow.38 
American citizens, fresh off their victorious involvement in World War II, needed to be 
convinced to support a national security strategy reliant on nuclear weapons. Although in 
the early years of the Atomic Age this war of the future was expected to take place 
primarily in Europe, the battlefield quickly became global in scope. The relatively new 
medium of television served as the primary vehicle by which the military and 
government could present information about nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy to the 
American public. The message of these programs evolved along with advances in 
military technology to meet the demands of a changing audience during the period of 
1949 to 1970.  
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A. IN THE BEGINNING: FUN WITH ATOMS 
Some of the first messages about nuclear war presented to the American public 
were explaining the mysteries of the atom, and, more importantly, convincing citizens 
that the United States could emerge from a nuclear war victorious. 
One of the iconic movies from the early nuclear era is the 1951 Civil Defense 
educational movie, Duck and Cover.39 Featuring the overly cautious animated Bert the 
Turtle, the movie instructs school-age children on what to do in case of an atomic bomb 
detonation. The movie had a resurgence of cultural notoriety as a feature in the 1981 
documentary Atomic Café in which it was presented with a great deal of irony.40 Much of 
the information, such as the notion that a newspaper or coat would offer shelter from an 
atomic blast, is outright propaganda exploiting early ignorance about the effects of the 
bomb.41 However, Duck and Cover offers valuable insight into early interpretations of 
nuclear warfare. The film serves as a representation of the newly formed role of citizens 
in nuclear warfare and shows popular threat perceptions of the early 1950s. The program 
features a teacher presenting the two types of possible attacks: those with warning and 
those without. The first type of attack, one that comes with warning, is a testament to the 
faith in early warning systems and technology to mitigate the impact of nuclear war. The 
second type of attack, one without warning, was a new concept for the American citizen 
and one that caused considerable angst and needed to be addressed in order to gain 
popular support for strategies dependent on nuclear weapons.
42
  
Duck and Cover addresses the possibility of nuclear war with two prominent 
themes in the message presented to the American people. The first is that with modern 
technology and constant vigilance can one can live normally in the shadow of the 
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 First, the movie hails U.S. civil defense forces and men in uniform who would 
“most likely” offer warning before an attack. The attentive civilians with binoculars 
represent another form of warning; however, these vigilant citizens also represent a 
blurring of the line between home front and battlefield. More important are the images of 
high-tech early detection systems. Although the technology is not explained to any 
degree, the message is clear: U.S. technology will conquer the Soviet atomic threat.  
In case such technology falls short, the film dives into the second common theme 
of the propaganda of the time: with proper preparation, one can survive an atomic strike. 
Citizens needed assurance that they could survive in the event of a surprise attack. The 
reality of the advice ranged from extremely dubious to potentially useful in extreme 
circumstances. The child, diving off his bike for shelter offered by a street curb would 
stand little chance at against an atomic strike. Instructions to seek shelter inside a 
basement or hallway, however, were somewhat more realistic. The more important aspect 
of the film is that it offers hope that an atomic exchange would not necessarily result in 
total annihilation. Duck and Cover ignores the aftermath of atomic warfare and the 
inevitable dramatic social and economic consequences, but offers topical reassurance to 
viewers. The true value of the message is that training and preparation could mitigate the 
impact of an atomic blast, and it was the duty of citizens to be ready for such 
inevitability.   
A is for Atom is an example of efforts to dispel some of the mystery associated 
with the Atomic Age. The animated film is designed for elementary-school audiences and 
recognizes that the “Dawn of the Atomic Age” has forced citizens to for any eventuality. 
The thrust of this film, however, is the power of the atom as the “answer to a dream as 
old as man himself... a source of infinite power.” This animated short focuses on the 
scientific benefits of atomic power in an effort to ease fears associated with the atomic 
age. The film notes the ability of science and industry to make the impossible possible 
with the production of the first atomic bomb. This emphasis on science and industry as a 
means to overcome seemingly unconquerable challenges strikes at the core of the idea of 
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strategy adopted by the public during the Atomic Age. The film concludes with an 




Atomic Alert is another film targeting the public about how to survive an atomic 
bomb. Again, the film has an overlay of technology as a means to conquer the threat of 
the atomic bomb. The group of children working with a Geiger counter transitions to 
scientists in a lab working with radioactive material before the narrator describes the 
slight chance of citizens being involved with an atomic bomb. The underlying message is 
that every citizen, just like members of the military, is part of the team designed 
effectively survive and defend against an atomic bomb: “Like any team,” the narrator 
notes, this team can “only be successful if every member knows his job.” The 
responsibility of the citizen of the atomic age is to practice and train to survive in the 
event of war. This video also addresses the danger of a bomb coming without warning 
and closes with the message “our very lives may depend on always being alert.”45 
The message of these early films is that every citizen has a responsibility to 
always be alert and prepared for an atomic strike. This message addresses both the 
anxieties of citizens in the uncertain atomic age and the responsibilities of citizens in a 
time of war. The mass politics of the 19th and 20th centuries and the era of total war from 
1914 to 1945 greatly increased the need for citizens to redefine their place in society at 
war. The educational films for general consumption and the military training films for 
members of the DOD sought to define this role. 
B. MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BOMB 
The messages presented to the American people were strikingly similar to those 
presented to the armed forces members in various training films from this era. Citizens 
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and soldiers alike required further explanation of the mystery of the atomic bomb in order 
to carry on normal life and the U.S. government’s message placed great emphasis on 
modern technology and preparedness. One of the concerns that came with the bomb 
which required significant explanation was radiation. Citizens and soldiers shared 
concern with the impact of the ‘new’ threat of radiation, and the U.S. government sought 
to ease these fears.  
The same emphasis on faith in technology and the need for preparedness as a 
solution for combating the Soviet atomic threat is the same message presented to troops 
in military training videos of the early 1950s. Self-Preservation in an Atomic Bomb 
Attack is a training film in which an experienced and knowledgeable Army master 
sergeant discusses the effects of an atomic bomb on a civilian target and what the young 
recruits in the video could do to enhance their survivability.46 The master sergeant 
acknowledges the destructive potential of the bomb when he warns the recruits that, 
without proper preparation they would “have a future like an ice cube in a hot toddy.”47 
However, when he notes that the bomb is “like a woman” and the recruits would be wise 
to “never underestimate its power,” he downplays the threat of the bomb by relating it to 
a challenging, but manageable aspect of life.
48
 Furthermore, the master sergeant draws 
similarities between an atomic strike and the Battle of Britain, and notes that the British 
were able to survive because of well executed civil defense measures.  
In the final frames of the video, the young sailor expresses concern over a surprise 
attack. The senior non-commissioned officer eases his fears by reminding him that 
worrying about the unexpected is futile; “a safe could fall on your head,” but more 
importantly reminding the sailor that with the correct measures he can survive an attack, 
and moreover it is his duty to do so and continue his military responsibilities.
49
 Medical 
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Aspects of Nuclear Radiation is a 1951 Department of Defense film aimed specifically at 
easing fears about radiation. The narrative downplays misunderstandings about the 
dangers of nuclear radiation. Radiation, the movie explains, is a natural occurrence and is 
similar to the rays one is exposed to while sunbathing. Like a sunburn, bee sting, or 
rattlesnake bite, radiation can be tolerated at various levels by different individuals.  
This film also harps on the mastery of science over radiation, citing the example 
of cancer treatment. In the event of nuclear war, one must be much more worried about 
the blast effects of the bomb than the radiation, because with proper preparation science 
can mitigate the impacts of radiation. The film shows a group of men playing cards, 
presumably in a concrete structure, briefly pause while a nuclear blast goes off outside. 
After a brief flicker of the lights and a shrug of the shoulders, the card game continues. 
Worrying about radiation, the narrator advises, is like worrying about led-poisoning 
while engaged in a gunfight. Furthermore, the blast effects are not-unlike those 
experienced and survived by soldiers in WWII. Ultimately the film seeks to put citizens’ 
fears about radiation at ease by restoring faith in technology and preparedness to mitigate 
the damaging effects of nuclear war.
50
  
The reference to WWII bombings in Medical Aspects of Radiation, like that in 
many of the other programs, is a reflection of the early visions of how the bomb would be 
used. The strategic bombing campaign launched against Japan by General Curtis Lemay 
and Colonel Tommy Powers had introduced a concept that had already made massive 
casualties in bombing a reality with the hundred thousand plus deaths resulting from the 
firebombing of Tokyo. To some strategists in the early stages of the atomic era, the 
power of the atomic bomb was “only a quantitative distinction,” and it was “just another 
weapon in the arsenal.”51 With the creation of Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1948 
under the leadership of General Curtis LeMay, early plans for the use of nuclear weapons 
were a continuation of those used in World War II. LeMay identified transportation, 
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industry, and infrastructure targets across the Soviet Union. However, this strategy was 
accompanied by the realization that the Soviets would likely draw similar plans. Such a 
conclusion logically led to the expectation that Americans would face a bombing 
campaign similar to those of World War II.
52
  
Although a parallel existed between the initial plans on how to implement nuclear 
weapons and World War II strategy, the early years of the Atomic Era also presented the 
military with a challenge that was decidedly different from the traditional American 
approach to war. Following the Axis surrender, Americans were set to collect the peace 
dividend and reduce the massive wartime military, a venture into which President 
Truman dove headlong. Although military leaders acknowledged that nuclear weapons 
would play a role in such a conflict, they also realized “war with the Soviet Union would 
require immense quantities of military manpower.”53 Such manpower would require 
rabid mobilization of industry and of massive conscript force. Educating the American 
public, starting with school age children and continuing through prime time television, 
about the hazards of nuclear war was one way to prepare the population for mobilization 
should conflict erupt.54  
C. THE BIG PICTURE 
With a view of a home front besieged by strategic bombing and the need for a 
massive conscript army occupying territory abroad, the distinction between civilian and 
soldier lost the clarity enjoyed by Americans during World War II. The need to have a 
public prepared for nuclear war was a logical step. The television presented a medium to 
reach citizens en masse and prepare them to do their part in a potential conflict. 
One program that sought to bridge the gap between soldier and citizen was The 
Big Picture. The Big Picture was produced by the United States Army between 1950 and 
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1975 and aired on ABC.55 This series featured information about various aspects of the 
military. Featuring Master Sargent Steve Queen as the narrator and host, The Big Picture 
portrayed a technologically advanced military ready to take on any opposition. The 
messages of technology coupled with individual vigilance as a means for military victory 
also sought to ease citizens’ fears of the Soviet threat while reminding the masses of its 
role in a nation preparing for war.  
An early episode entitled “Individual Preparedness in Atomic Attack” harps on 
the importance of individual foot soldiers as the backbone of every army. By tying the 
nuclear bomb into the larger narrative of technological advances that “challenged the 
fighting man,” nuclear war was portrayed as a conflict which still accounts for the 
importance of individuals. Although MSgt. Queen acknowledges that nuclear weapons 
may be the greatest challenge to soldiers yet, it can be met just as soldiers overcame the 
challenges of the catapult, crossbow, rifle, or tank. Most importantly, “many of the 
methods employed are equally applicable to citizens of our country in the event of an 
atomic attack.”56 The review of the damage of Hiroshima comes away with the 
conclusion that soldiers must continue to do their job in the event of an attack, and this 
may be truer for those in the rear than those on the front line, for industrial and logistics 
hubs may be the most likely to suffer nuclear attack. For the civilian audience targeted by 
the show, this message strikes a chord particularly close to home.  
In addition to preaching vigilance, the video seeks to explain the bomb in order to 
help soldiers and citizens come to terms with the possibility of nuclear war. This takes the 
form of going over various ways to minimize radiation and blast exposure. This also 
explains the difference between air bursts, surface blasts, and underwater explosions, and 
highlights the general military bearing necessary to carry out a mission following an 
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atomic attack. Although “there is no minimizing the potency of the nuclear weapon,”57 
with training and information one can greatly increase the chances of survival. Ultimately 
the message of this episode is that with proper preparation the damage of nuclear attack 
can be mitigated. Soldiers and by extension citizens, have a duty to be vigilant and 
prepared to carry out their duty following at attack. For soldiers, this is not different than 
any other military obligations. For citizens, this message calls for a society prepared to 
engage in total war. 
These early programs reflect uncertainty on the ways which the new technology 
of the atomic bomb would be integrated into national security policy. With the first 
Soviet bomb tested in 1949, the thought of a devastating strike reaching anywhere on the 
home front caused great angst with the American people.
58
 The fear of bomb, however, 
was outweighed by fear of the Soviet menace. By 1950, Americans “seemed not only 
ready to accept the bomb, but to support any measures necessary to maintain atomic 
supremacy.”59 These programs demonstrate an effort to meet the demand for acceptance 
of the bomb. One cannot argue, then, that the films spawned from a need to manufacture 
consent. Official efforts to educate citizens were not driven by a need to persuade citizens 
to support the arms race that would follow. Rather, they represent the government’s effort 
to provide the masses material with which they could justify their already implied 
consent of a national defense strategy featuring nuclear weapons. 
D. THE NEW LOOK 
With Eisenhower’s New Look in the wake of the Korean War and the advent of 
the hydrogen bomb, the notion that nuclear war could successfully be waged and won 
with the proper preparation transitioned from an implied message to doctrine. The result 
was the placement of strategic airpower at the “forefront of the nation’s Cold War 
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defense policy.”60 With this transition the message to the public remained focused on 
technology as the means to mitigate the perils of nuclear warfare.  
The Big Picture hails the technological prowess of the modern military in 
numerous episodes during this era. One of the best examples is the episode “The 
Common Defense” (1959). This episode offers a summary of the recent technological 
and operational successes of the military. Queen emphasizes that the armed forces “Form 
a mighty flexible shield, which by its very existence deters the sinister designs of the 
forces of aggression. Your Army, Navy, and Air Force, form a valiant team that 
continues to discharge with glory its great and proud responsibility; The Common 
Defense of the United States.”61 With a montage of current military forces mixed with 
the monuments of Washington, DC, the narrator notes the communist forces that threaten 
the free world. The emphasis then goes to each branch launching satellites, the marvels of 
NASA, and an explanation of the cooperation of military and industry in excelling the 
development and production of ballistic missiles. These pleasing images of the F-104 
Starfighter, the USS Nautilus, and the Hercules missiles and the men of “vision and 
daring” who operate them present an image of the servicemen of today directly linked to 
the minutemen of Bunker Hill and Continentals of Valley Forge.
62
  
Another interesting aspect of this episode is the emphasis on the role of the U.S. 
military not just defending for the defense of the homeland, but for the common defense 
of the world. Operations in the arctic contribute to global knowledge, Navy and Army 
efforts in Formosa caused the Chinese Red menace to stand down-for now, and our 
NATO anchor, Turkey, demonstrated proficiency in the U.S. weapons while celebrating 
their independence. This emphasis on global defense is not unique in The Big Picture; 
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however, this example links the recent technological advances of the military directly 
with the U.S.-led Allied defense against communist expansion worldwide.
63
 
Nearly two billion dollars was given to 40 Allied nations to strengthen the 
common defense, McQueen notes, but with the emphasis on research and development 
and new, not yet realized technology, there remains an underlying sense of the need to 
look toward the future. This takes a not so indirect route when McQueen takes time to 
explain the necessity of raising military pay to obtain not just men of a fighting spirit, but 
with highly technical and specialized training. Defense Secretary Neal McElroy makes an 
appearance at the closing of the episode to remind the audience that the funding being 
spent on the defense forces and the highly technical experts is essential, now more than 
ever. As the episode closes with scenes from top universities producing citizens ready to 
improve the world, the service academies churning out the future military leaders, and 
scenes across the United States including a heavy dose of workers and church going 
citizens all to a chorus of God Bless America, the technology and preparedness of the 
armed forces becomes synonymous with the American way of life.
64
  
The image presented to the American public in The Big Picture is one tying the 
nuclear bomb to the ideological struggle of the Cold War. Another episode focused on 
this theme is “The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield” (1959). The episode begins 
by citing the 2.5 million-strong Soviet army and the additional 4 million troops being 
trained by the Chinese, North Vietnamese, and North Korea satellites as steps being taken 
by our communist rivals to prepare for an all-out conventional war. Although the 900,000 
U.S. troops are supplemented with 2 million from NATO, it is not mere numbers that will 
allow us to prevail in the struggle. Rather, training and equipping these men with the 
most modern weapons possible and the images of the high-tech forces of the future 
represent the best strategy for the Free World to succeed against the Communist bloc. 
The emphasis on the necessity of our forces to be flexible enough to respond 
quickly and with enough power to accomplish the mission calls for a qualitative strength 
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vice a quantitative strength in the military of the future. Modern weapons and a force 
prepared for the atomic battle area are presented as the solution for the challenges of 
today and tomorrow. McQueen notes, “The challenge is one faced not just by the Army, 
but by the nation,” prompting a conversation about the cost of current requirements and 
the need to continue technological advances, “for today’s finest weapons are tomorrows 
second best” and “there is no second place in war.”65 This reflects the need to instill in 
the citizens of the United States a sense of duty and responsibility to financially 
supporting the DOD. This includes supporting artillery and rockets, both nuclear and 
conventional, necessary to cover increasing distances.
66
 
E. THE BIG PICTURE IN THE 1960S 
As the Cold War entered its second decade, nuclear weapons remained central to 
national strategy. In 1961 and 1962, this conflict entered into a stage of acute crisis. The 
presentation of nuclear issues to the American people, however, moved away from center 
stage. The episodes of The Big Picture in the early 1960s were largely a series of 
historical pieces such as “Breakout and Pursuit” about Operation Cobra, “What makes a 
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series of episodes profiling “Famous Generals.”67 There were, however, some episodes 
focused on current military units and missions. These episodes emphasized duty of the 
American soldier to defend freedom around the world, the capability of the U.S. military, 
and the quality of the U.S. soldier. 
In a two-part series titled “The U.S. Army in Berlin: Timetable for Crisis” and 
“Checkpoint Charlie,” The Big Picture reviewed the importance of the presence in Berlin 
as the Berlin crisis from 1958 until 1961 had reached an extreme with the construction of 
the wall along the inner German border. The soldiers have “learned to live with 
tension…to maintain our rights in West Berlin and carry out the United States’ 
policies.”68 The episodes complete with menacing music, and shots of East German and 
Soviet military personnel, demonstrate the threat to the West present in Berlin. In these 
episodes, the fundamental differences in ideology and way of life between East and West 
Germany take center stage instead of nuclear weapons. The American soldiers are 
presented as the defenders of freedom, and are even thanked by local West German 
citizens. As the episode reveals the escalation of the Berlin Crisis, there is the constant 
message that the vigilance and resolve of the American soldier kept the situation under 
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control while forcing the communists to eventually back down. The message in the 
episodes about Berlin is summarized in the closing remarks of “Checkpoint Charlie;” 
“the weight of the burden of freedom’s defense once again rests upon soldiers, upon their 
determination to carry out their responsibilities. On the front line of the free world, these 
soldiers of the United States Army are well prepared.”69  
Another theme in The Big Picture during the 1960s was the quality of the 
American soldier. In “Your Military Neighbor,” the role of service members in the 
community both stateside and abroad is emphasized as part of the conscription military 
and the U.S. version of the citizen soldier at the dawn of the Vietnam War. Boy Scouts, 
parenthood, physical fitness programs, medical missions and engineering projects are 
cited as examples of the peaceful and constructive contributions service members make 
to society while still “standing ready to counter any threat.”70 In “Character Guidance,” 
viewers witness the moral training given to troops to better prepare them for challenges, 
because “Our army today is being equipped with new and more powerful weapons to 
deter any aggressor. But the caliber of our weapons alone will not win a war, or even 
defend our nation successfully. It is the caliber of the men behind the weapons that will 
decide any future conflict.”71 
This emphasis on the value of the individual soldier and the historic triumphs of 
the United States Military is a change in the presentation of the military to the public 
from the 1950s episodes of The Big Picture which emphasized the modern technology 
and weapons of the atomic age. Multiple factors contributed to this change. In the 1950s 
the concept of nuclear warfare was new and brought much uncertainty to the minds of 
American citizens. By the 1960s, people had grown accustom to living in the shadow of 
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the bomb and the Soviet threat did not seem as eminent as the age of Sputnik. 
Furthermore, the faith in technology introduced in the 1950s may have taken effect by the 
following decade. The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 marked 
two of the tensest moments of the Cold War. Yet the emphasis of these programs is more 
the history and tradition of the U.S. military than on the capabilities of the times. Some 
themes that remained in the 1960s were the value of individual soldiers in modern 
warfare and the quality of American Troops. In the 1960s, as leftist tendencies began to 
dominate popular culture, it was important for the Big Picture to remind the public “not 
to forget or take servicemen for grated in times of peace.”72 With this emphasis on the 
history and tradition of the military images of nuclear weapons and modern technology 
were pushed to the periphery of the military image, despite their ascendency to the 
highest levels of military strategy. 
F. WINNING THE NUCLEAR WAR WITH VIGILANCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
The messages from the 1950s can best be classified as futuristic militarism. The 
Big Picture and other programs sought to depict nuclear technology as an asset to be 
utilized for the interests of the free world, but the effort required all citizens to do their 
part. During the first decade of the Cold War images of mushroom clouds represented 
“U.S. dominance and hope for the future.”73 Anxieties were eased by presenting the 
bomb as “unthreatening technology to be exploited” which “allowed Americans to 
support the new central tenant of National Defense.”74 Along with this effort to ease 
concerns over the new technology was the promotion of civic duty on citizens to embrace 
responsibilities traditionally reserved for those in the military. 
The presentation of nuclear warfare also shifted with developments in nuclear 
strategy. The comparison of the atom bomb to World War II bombing campaigns in A is 
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for Atom and other early programs reflect early strategy regarding the atomic bomb. In 
the years immediately following World War II, leaders still viewed the bomb simply as a 
larger version of conventional air munitions and the best and most likely use would be 
through strategic bombing. Although there were some currents questioning the strategic 
validity of the bomb, the prevailing thought was that the bomb was an “irresistible force 
in contemporary warfare” and “the best available means to redressing military 
balance.”75 As strategy shifted toward flexible response the image of nuclear warfare was 
presented with greater emphasis on the human element on the nuclear battlefield. Ground 
forces on the nuclear battlefield and the actual service members assigned to SAC took a 
more prevalent role in episodes of The Big Picture. 
Audiences of the 1950s were defined by patriotism and enthusiasm for the 
American military. In contrast, the 1960s saw “the decline of cold-war patriotic and civic 
pageantry.”76 As the public became more aware of the potential impacts of nuclear 
warfare and more wary about conflict in general, the subject of nuclear war disappeared 
from the Big Picture. This decline did not owe to a single cause. The consumerism so 
essential to the American way of life provided more options, freedoms that also 
encouraged people to question and become involved with the direction of foreign policy 
aims. As the Soviet threat receded into détente, so did the urgency central to creating the 
sense of duty in citizens’ lives. All of these were aspects of “the cruel paradox that what 
required defense through patriotic and civic activism also generated competition for the 
time and energies the guardians of cold-war civic virtue demanded of their fellow- 
Americans.”77 
One characteristic that remained constant throughout this period was the emphasis 
on vigilance. The alertness demonstrated by Bert the Turtle in Duck and Cover brought 
this message to elementary school children. Again in Atomic Alert citizens promoted this 
value. The message was military members were taught the value of alertness in the face 
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of thermonuclear war in Self-Preservation in an Atomic Bomb Attack. The Big Picture 
episodes cherished vigilance as one of the most important characteristics of our military 
members, whether in “The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield” or “United States 
Army in Berlin” this trait defeated nuclear armed communist foes. Likewise in the series 
of episodes in the 1960s focusing on great military leaders of the past, vigilance and 
preparedness were highlighted as qualities intrinsic in U.S. forces.  
The period in question witnessed a public, first wary of the atomic bomb, 
transition to one supportive of a strategy reliant on nuclear weapons and them come full 
circle with the anti-war sentiments of the late 1960s. The message presented to the 
American people likewise shifted to promote and react to the changing opinion. This 
evolution is a demonstration of an empowered public wrestling with the theoretical 
benefits of nuclear deterrence and the reality of warfare with the conflict in Vietnam. 
Theorizing nuclear warfare and presenting its image proved to be an easier task when the 
reality of warfare was absent, or at least a fading memory, in the American conscience. 
As the United States transitions from a 10-year experience of ongoing conflict in the 
Middle East which was politicized and televised daily, once again citizens must 
determine their role in a democratic society with relation to external threats and the role 
of nuclear armaments in national security strategy. 
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III. OLIVE BRANCHES AND ICBMS: THE SOVIET PEACE 
OFFENSIVE 
Soviet strategic communications pursued goals similar to those of the United 
States in both garnering the support of the domestic population and influencing the 
behavior of populations abroad. The challenge in public presentation was similar to the 
approach taken by the Soviet Union in ruling its diverse populations. The vast territory of 
the Russian Empire included rural and urban populations; ethnic groups to the east 
descended from Mongolian nomads, minorities in the Caucasus with closer ties to the 
Middle East, and western oriented populations in the Central European satellites; each of 
which required different policies. Comparisons of Soviet practices in these regions 
demonstrate a tendency to tailor methods to fit specific populations. Domestically, this 
challenge was more manageable thanks to the monopoly on communications. Abroad, 
this was considerably more difficult due to Western emphasis on transparency and 
resistance to propaganda. Ultimately, from the Western perspective, Soviet messages 




In the 1950s, the Soviet Peace Offensive presented an image of the Soviet Union 
as a responsible power and discussions of disarmament first came to the table.
79
 This 
period represents a merging of the two formative challenges of the Cold War: the battle 
for hearts and minds and the pursuit of successful nuclear strategy. The nature of the west 
and the freedom of speech central to any democracy allow for dissenting opinions to 
penetrate any academic or social discourse; in fact such dissent is encouraged and 
essential to the functioning of democratic societies. The idea of transparency—the “right 
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to know what their government was doing”—was “embedded in the American polity.”80 
At the same time, the post-World War II US and Western Europe populations were well 
aware of the dangers of mass persuasion and increasingly “wary about communication.”81 
These were the challenges confronting both Soviet and Western policy makers in the 
realm of public nuclear diplomacy. Both the Soviets and the United States attempted to 
sell their systems by gaining a better understanding of their target audiences. The Soviet 
information campaign never quite managed to understand the interests of western citizens 
enough to present its case in an appealing fashion.82 
The Soviets faced a twofold challenge. Khrushchev needed to keep his citizens 
vigilant and prepared for the inevitable struggle with the imperialist West in the Marxist-
Leninist teleological progression of mankind, but at the same time “there had to remain a 
future for mankind.”83 This same concept transferred to the international realm, where 
Soviet leaders worked at “stoking those revolutionary fires while at the same time 
insuring that they would not lead to open conflagration.”84 The result was an often tough 
to interpret combination of “menacing thrusts against the West with a search for detente 
with the United States.”85 
A. PROPAGANDA AND THE SOVIET STATE 
The nature of a revolutionary state rests on creating total mass support. To this 
end, the revolution in Russia was “unthinkable before the era of mass politics, before the 
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development of modern communications… before the time of modern propaganda.”86 
Those who formed the definitive Soviet institutions developed their mentality during the 
Revolution in which success was enabled “because they were better than their opponents 
in getting their message across to the people.”87 This mentality of managing mass politics 
through indoctrination permeated the Soviet state and manifested itself in the foreign 
policy outlook well beyond the lifespan of the leaders of the Revolution. In the 1930s, 
Stalin pressed the idea of a revolutionary movement abroad to achieve the objectives of 
the Soviet state. Following WWII, this approach to foreign relations joined with a 
“’peace movement’ that was now centered on atomic weapons.”88 During the Cold War 
the socialist idea of the Popular Front, coupled with this “peace movement,” “would be 
among the more potent weapons in the Soviet arsenal.”89 
The Popular Front movement, however, was not a product of the Cold War, but 
rather a defensive concept developed in the interwar period to bury the hatchet between 
socialist and communist movements in the face of European fascism. This front had two 
main approaches. The first was in the revolutionary tradition of “mass uprising of the 
oppressed; violent destruction of the stat; confrontation with the dominant classes to 
uproot the bases of their power; retribution and reprisals against the old order; extreme 
vigilance for the security of the revolution.” 90 The second thrust was a gradualism that 
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change came through public influence by working-class and progressive movements 
rather than violent uprising and recognized “breadth of consensus”92 as the key element 
to victory.93 
It was this second form of a worldwide communist movement that lasted beyond 
World War II and into the Cold War with the formation of the Cominform in 1947. The 
Cominform was designed to further international socialist revolutionary movements, but 
came to rely on the truism that any authentic socialist movement required “political, 
economic, and military aid from the Soviet Union.”94 This myth led the Cominform to 
evolve into little more than “an instrument of Soviet interests.”95  
Although the Popular Front ideology was one of the strongest attributes of the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War, it also was one of the fundamental causes of the conflict. 
There existed “structural incompatibilities”96 between western democratic institutions and 
Soviet socialism. However, more so than expansionist ideas, hegemonic aspirations, or 
misunderstandings it was the Soviet “projection of these methods into the international 
arena”97 which prevented coexistence from being a viable option. The shift to a gradual 
approach to worldwide socialist movement caused opponents to be more fearful of an 
underground, internal enemy than they were of open revolutionaries. The West held firm 
in its belief that “in their [Soviet] eyes there are two worlds which cannot live together 
and that sooner or later one or the other must triumph”98 and any rhetoric to the contrary 
was thus undermined by these fears. The presentation of revolutionary ideas to the free 
world by the Soviets following World War II was received by democratic nations with 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1998), 65-69; Eley, Forging Democracy, 262-8, 
94 Heinz Timmermann, The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow Beijing and 
Communist Parties in the West, trans. Julius W. Friend (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 28. 
95 Ibid., 29, 25-31. 
 96 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 298. 
97 Ibid. 
98 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World 
Communism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 19. 
 35 
the same trepidation that marked socialist movements for the first half of the 19
th
 century; 
these movements were seen as a threat to domestic and international politics and were 
received accordingly. 
B. PEACEFUL PROPAGANDA AND NUCLEAR BLUSTER: 1949–1962 
The formation of NATO on 4 April 1949 presented a direct threat to the Soviet 
sphere of influence.
99
 Five months later, the Soviets ended the U.S. monopoly on nuclear 
weapons in the first steps toward counterbalancing the growing U.S. superpower.
100
 With 
this development, the Cold War took shape as a conflict “characterized by a war of words 
and threatened use of nuclear weapons…in which the idea of nuclear war was constantly 
on the mind of international public opinion.”101 This feeling was only exacerbated with 
more powerful weapons and arsenals in the coming years, particularly thermonuclear 
weapons. The Soviets tested their first thermonuclear device with the RDS-6 in 1953 
shortly after the U.S. Mike test at Bikini Atoll in 1952.
102
  
Along with these developments came the changing of the Soviet guard with 
Stalin’s death in 1953. At Stalin’s funeral, Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov attempted to 
address the growing international tensions when he stated “there is no dispute… which 
could not be settled by peaceful means.”103 Malenkov’s tenure was short-lived, however, 
and after a two-year power struggle, Khrushchev emerged as the new Soviet leader and 
immediately launched an effort that came to be known as the Peace Offensive. The title 
derived from the Soviet campaign focused on combating U.S. policy and interest under 
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the guise of peaceful ends. Khrushchev believed that the international class struggle was 
still underway, but that individual parties abroad could “contribute by its own strategy to 
shifting the world balance toward socialism.”104 Moscow was to serve as “the dogmatic 
authority of a leading party,” lest the international movement “lose sight of the common 
revolutionary goal.”105 Khrushchev, therefore, sought to lead this movement through 
revolutionary rhetoric while coming to terms with the devastating potential of 
thermonuclear war. 
The first aspect of the message to the masses continued in the Marxist-Leninist 
mode of a “struggle for peace” against the “aggressive, warlike, and militaristic nature of 
capitalism.”106 This message catered to communists, the working class, political and 
ethnic minorities, and other potential communists worldwide. The thrust of this message 
was to portray the United States and NATO as capitalist fat cats, pursuing foreign policy 
objectives at the expense of the downtrodden. U.S. nuclear policy was portrayed as a 
means to bully the oppressed peoples of the word to feed the insatiable economic 
appetites of the capitalist that controlled western democracies.
107
  
The second aspect of Soviet public diplomacy was the concept of peaceful 
coexistence. This message was used by Khrushchev repeatedly, starting in 1955. The 
peaceful coexistence message targeted those neutral to communism as well as those who 
were anti-communist, but potentially against NATO or other aspects of U.S. foreign 
policy. This message attempted to portray the Soviet Union as the good guy on the 
international stage and often presented the idea of decreasing international tension as the 
Soviet objective.
108
 Although peaceful coexistence strayed from the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition in that it de-emphasized the inevitable conflict between communism and 
capitalism, Soviet actions during this time continued to prepare for such a conflict. 
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During these early years of the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a 
considerable technological advantage over the Soviets. Furthermore, the rearmament of 
West Germany in 1955 fueled Soviet insecurities as their perceived conventional 
advantage over the west was called into question. Despite the genuine belief by both 
Eisenhower and Khrushchev that their counterparts did not want an open conflict 
following the Geneva Summit in fall of 1955, both sides continued to take actions that 
reinvigorated insecurities. Khrushchev attended the summit to ease tensions and revamp 
the Soviet image in the West but felt his efforts went unrecognized by the United States. 
Likewise, Eisenhower did not want to embrace the Soviet leader entirely for fear of 
legitimizing his Peace Offensive and losing some of the neutral nations.
109
 
During the 1950s, Khrushchev faced the challenge of remaining on equal footing 
with the United States, despite a lack of nuclear parity, in order to limit the potential of a 
rearmed Western Germany and maintain the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1956 the 
Soviets reported the first successful test of a ballistic missile. Unfortunately for 
Khrushchev, this technological advancement did not translate to the public diplomacy 
victory for which he had hoped as the United States largely ignored the achievement. The 
following year, however, the Soviets achieved a major technological and propaganda 
victory with the launch of Sputnik, the world’s first manmade satellite. The October 4, 
1957, event was “a grave defeat for the United States”110 in the eyes of the public already 
acclimated to the burgeoning space race. Although Soviet capabilities still lagged behind 
those of their rivals, western perceptions were forever changed, as was the ideological 
landscape of the Cold War; U.S. fears of the Soviets became the top public concern.
111
 
Most specifically, Sputnik raised the real possibility that the Soviet Union could achieve 
the means to build and deploy nuclear warheads that could reach U.S. soil. 
At the same time, Khrushchev’s campaign continued to spread its message in 
hopes of leveraging the perceived nuclear capability to reach Soviet foreign policy goals. 
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TASS, the Soviet press agency, was the agency primarily responsible for overseas press 
correspondence through the 1950s. TASS correspondents served as both propagandists 
and information gatherers abroad. Such publications as Pravda, The Moscow Times, and 
the New Times produced pro-Soviet publications in English to be distributed in the West 
under the supervision of TASS.
112
  
Khrushchev also sought to exercise public diplomacy through more modern 
means of communication. By 1958, Radio Moscow was broadcasting more than 350 
hours of programming daily in various languages around the world, spreading the peace 
offensive.113 These broadcasts encouraged the growth of socialist institutions, promoted 
working-class political activism, and discredited capitalist adversaries.
114
  
Then in 1959 following a visit to the United States, Khrushchev embraced the 
opportunity to address the American public on national television with a speech titled 
“Nations Should Live as Good Neighbors.” In the speech, Khrushchev promoted the 
Soviet people’s “wish to live in peace and friendship with you”115 but warned that “forces 
that obstruct an improvement in the relations between our countries and a relaxation in 
international tension are still influential in the United States.”116 The first topic 
Khrushchev tackled in the speech was disarmament; he pointed out the astronomical 
sums being poured into the U.S. defense industry. The Soviet leader then discussed the 
numerous benefits of the Soviet society, including the true democratic nature of 
socialism, and the universal benefits of education, health care, pensions, and housing in 
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such a society. In one of the more telling passages, he admonishes his viewers that Soviet 
industry will overtake the U.S. productive forces in the coming years—as it would have 
done so sooner if not for the devastation of WWII. Ultimately Khrushchev used the 
unprecedented platform to promote peaceful coexistence while simultaneously touting 
the superiority of the Soviet system as a subtle warning against the current U.S. course.
117
 
It was classic dezinformatsia, in the 1950s terminology—though after 1960, the term 
“active measures” was preferred to describe the “overt and covert techniques for 
influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries.”118 
Khrushchev’s U.S. viewers recognized these efforts as propaganda—and tended 
to see the west lagging on this front, as well. The same week as the premier’s visit, The 
New York Times Magazine ran an article titled “Why Russia is Ahead in Propaganda.”119 
The article faulted the U.S. approach for its naïve and simplistic overreliance on 
presenting the truth as a means to compel people to make the right decision, while the 
Soviet approach demonstrates a “firm grasp of the protean nature modern propaganda,” 
which “has enabled them to coordinate their diverse policies and operations to achieve 
the optimum results.”120 Furthermore, the article links the timing of Khrushchev’s visit 
with a recent Soviet lunar probe as an example how modern “propaganda of words 
reinforces—and is in turn reinforced by—the propaganda of deeds.”121 The article notes 
that communist strategic doctrine ties war, economics, politics, and diplomacy together to 
exploit cultural and ideological perceptions of the West. Ultimately, “American 
propaganda attempts to persuade,” the author notes, but “Soviet psychological strategy 
attempts to condition.”122  
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On the other hand, although the article praises the Soviet advantage in the 
propaganda realm, the acknowledgement of Soviet words and actions as propaganda calls 
into question the effectiveness of Khrushchev’s propaganda campaign. Information 
perceived to be propaganda lacked credibility, regardless of any factual support imbedded 
in the message. By this time, most of Khrushchev’s intended audience knew that his 
approach “involved a large measure of bluster and bluff, which in fact worked 
dangerously against his desired end.”123 The bluff took the form of using Sputnik, missile 
development, and atmospheric testing to “give the impression of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) capability sufficient to counteract America’s superiority.”124 
This ruse worked sufficiently throughout the 1950s when the U.S. lacked the capability to 
verify the Soviet arsenal, but broke down as U.S. long-range reconnaissance capabilities 
revealed a more accurate picture of the Soviet nuclear program.
125
 
 The same problem attached to TASS. The Novosti Press Agency (APN) was 
created in 1961 to overcome the challenges of TASS’s “blatant association with the 
Soviet government.”126 Despite the thinly masked ties to the state, Khrushchev sought 
legitimacy in international eyes with APN because of its alleged independence. APN was 
designed to “sell the Soviet Union in consumer-oriented markets abroad.”127 The APN 
produced series of booklets available by subscription or individual sale abroad. These 
booklets had titles such as “Communism Creates Brotherhood,” “Disarmament: The 
Road to a World without War,” and “Communism Means Peace.” The inscription on the 
opening page of such publications had the motto of the APN, “Information for a world in  
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need of mutual understanding.”128 Although these titles focus on various aspects of the 
ideological struggle, they share a common message vilifying capitalism and promoting 
peaceful coexistence. 
 “Communism Means Peace” points toward capitalism as the root of the 
Napoleonic wars, the Crimean war, the Spanish American war, and both world wars.
129
 It 
also lambasts the growth of the U.S. war industry following the formation of NATO and 
the dangerous idea of preventative war, but offers socialism as an “antithesis” to 
imperialism and a “rejection of war.”130 The tract acknowledges the struggle between 
Soviet Russia and the West as “expressing the class difference of these two social 
systems, the radical differences in their ideologies” and recognizes “every country is free 
to adhere to its own views,” but “some countries should not impose their views on other 
countries by means of war, or the force of arms.”131 The publication takes this point one 
step further when it rejects “all attempts made by certain representatives of Western 
countries to utilize the ideological contradictions of the two systems in order to justify the 
preparations for a military clash.”132 The Soviet message is that the current track of the 
U.S. will lead to war, and the world must choose between peaceful coexistence and 
thermonuclear war.
133
 The publication closes with a reminder that the Twenty-Second 
Congress Party Congress declared the “main aim of its foreign policy to be not only the 
prevention of a world war, but to exclude war for ever from the life of society.”134 
The disconnect between the Soviet nuclear program and the public diplomacy 
stance of the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrated the deep-seated problem with the 
Soviet’s superpower status: a lack of resources to support its perceived or aspired place in 
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the international order. Khrushchev attempted to overcome this shortfall through the 
Peace Offensive and the propagandistic demonstrations of Soviet capabilities. However, 
with the gap between the reality of capabilities and the need to maintain superpower 
status, “the temptation was always present to make up for this weakness by some rash 
expedient.”135 This expedient took the form of moving medium and intermediate range 
missiles to Cuba, and the resulting crisis of October 1962.
136
  
C. REACHING STRATEGIC PARITY 
After 1962, the Soviet message focused on Western militarism, aggression, and 
opposition to negotiations. This switch from promoting the positive message of the 
Soviet Union to focusing on the negative traits of the west came along with an 
international shift toward talks of limiting the arms race, reducing nuclear testing, and a 
brief period of eased tensions after the near catastrophe of the Cuban missile crisis.
137
 
The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 highlighted efforts to decrease tensions 
following the brinksmanship of the Cuban missile crisis.
138
 Efforts in the West to 
“emphasize that nuclear war would be the ultimate disaster”139 seemed to embrace some 
of the logic of Khrushchev’s Peace Offensive. However, the potential to capitalize on any 
mutual understanding gained from the crisis disappeared with the assassination of 
President Kennedy, and the subsequent regime change in the Soviet Union the following 
year.  
Although Khrushchev may have hoped finally to reap dividends from his 
aggressive Peace Offensive and strategic deception campaigns of the 1950s and early 
1960s against the U.S. imperialists, his successor inherited a “Soviet state humiliated by 
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the rival superpower.”140 Khrushchev may have genuinely attempted to demilitarize the 
Cold War and “reduce his country’s bloated defense establishment” but the result was 
“not only redundant but also counterproductive.”141 Leonid Brezhnev headed a regime 
that allowed for renewed military influence on foreign policy and the propaganda 
machine continued to wage war against the west.
142
 
The New Times and Pravda continued campaigns came now to emphasize the 
theme of western aggressiveness. From 1967 to 1969, the theme was central to 60 percent 
of the international relations articles. Although this rate was down from 75 percent in the 
period of 1960–1962, it still was the dominant theme in such media.143 The U.S. provided 
fuel for arguments about the aggressiveness and militarism of the west with Vietnam, and 
the Soviet propaganda campaign began to pursue a strategy of kombinatsia, the 
combination of various issues with general themes. For example, the south Asian 
conventional conflict thus could be lumped into the same category of nuclear armaments 
in the general theme of U.S. aggression and militarism.
144
 
Another target of Soviet propaganda in the 1960s was U.S. cooperation with so-
called West German revanchists. This message painted a picture of aggressive West 
Germans vying for European supremacy and pursuing control of nuclear weapons. 
NATO’s nuclear strategy also was portrayed as an effort to turn Western Europe into a 
battleground and fundamentally “endangered the very existence of Europe.”145  
Until the late 1960s, Soviet nuclear posture was largely based on strategic 
deception and propaganda. Soviets believed that the U.S. policy of massive retaliation 
would lead to the inevitability of general nuclear war. However, with NATO’s shift to 
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flexible response in 1967 the Soviets envisioned a different type of conflict should war 
erupt.
146
 This shift in perception and the subsequent willingness to discuss arms treaties 
productively is largely a result of achievements of the Soviet ICBM program. The 
development of the R-36 and UR-100 missiles as well as the 667A submarines gave the 
Soviet’s a level of strategic parity with the United States that allowed for limited 
cooperation in addressing nuclear issues.
147
 Only when this nuclear equilibrium was 




D. CONCLUSION: ATOMIC PROPAGANDA AND RUSSIAN PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY 
The ideological struggle and the nuclear arms race cannot be viewed as separate 
chapters in history, but are linked in the definitive struggle since World War II. Led by 
this relationship, the propaganda efforts of the two rivals reflect nuclear strategies. In the 
Soviet example, willingness to earnestly pursue arms limitation talks was not possible 
until a perceived equilibrium was achieved in strategic nuclear forces. Although the 
message of Soviet propaganda shifted during the first twenty years of the Cold War, its 
presence was never in question. The importance of propaganda and public diplomacy was 
not lost on Soviet leaders. Hailing from the lineage of the Russian Revolutionaries, the 
value of mobilizing the masses and popular support was central to Soviet strategy. The 
failure of the Soviet public diplomacy campaign lay in a lack of understanding of its 
American audience. Although freedom of speech made the audience easier to reach, the 
transparency also valued in the West prevented much of the Soviet information from 
being seen as anything beyond overt propaganda. Worse than simply being a foreign 
opinion, the Soviet methods were viewed as dangerous and subversive.  
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Rather than achieving any positive results for the Soviets, Moscow’s propaganda 
campaign created an environment in which the Western public was primed and ready to 
consume U.S. propaganda. The fear caused by the Soviet demonstrations of Sputnik, 
atmospheric testing, and the ICBM program far outweighed the potential good will 
sought after in the Peace Offensive. Throughout the 1950s and into the first half of the 
1960s, Western citizens, particularly those in the United States, had an up swell of 
patriotism, which can, at least in part, be attributed to the Soviet threat. The underlying 
theme of such patriotic movements was “the need to grid for protracted conflict against 
the communist world.”149 Furthermore, the Soviet efforts helped the dominant voice of 
U.S. internal critique to shift from scientists who had “sought to check the spread of 
weapons of destruction,” to those “concerned instead with refining the nation’s strategic 
approach to make it more effective.”150 Ultimately, the Peace Offensive did more harm 
than good for the Soviets. America developed heightened popular resolve to defeat the 
Soviets and became a society increasingly militarized in the name of patriotic duty. 
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IV. UNITED FRONT: OFFICIAL NATO COMMUNIQUÉS ON 
NUCLEAR ISSUES, 1949–1969 
The North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement. It is 
an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values which we hold in 
common. It represents the will of the peoples of the North Atlantic 
community not only to safeguard their freedom, but to seek increasing 
fulfillment of it. The central idea of the treaty is not a static one. It is 
conceived rather in the spirit of growth, of development, of progress.151 
The official communiqués of NATO during the Cold War reflect a managed 
agenda of balancing the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture with its interest in 
dialogue and negotiations. Although these communiqués were calculated strategic 
communications for world leaders, they also were open source documents available to 
offer the public insights on NATO strategy and garner support for the Alliance both in its 
member states and abroad. As such, the communiqués, when viewed in light of 
international events of the 1950s and 1960s, offer insight on leaders’ perceptions of the 
mass public and reflect their intentions to gain support on nuclear strategy.  
As implied by Dean Achenson’s statement, NATO was created to foster the 
community, which “is a growing and evolving body of people leading a common life 
under some form of shared social and political organization.”152 Such an evolution is 
evident in the first twenty years of NATO with regard to attitudes toward nuclear 
warfare. This period can be divided into two distinct phases with different trends in the 
tone of the communiqués. From 1949 to 1962, the communiqués emphasize establishing 
an adequate force through U.S.-led nuclear efforts and the necessity of both a nuclear 
arsenal and political and economic cooperation in meeting the Soviet threat. The 
communiqués of this time reflect geo-political developments, including the formation of 
NATO, the establishment of West German armed forces, and the founding of the Warsaw 
Pact, as well as a response to the Soviet Peace Offensive and strategic deception 
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campaign. The Cuban Missile Crisis marked a shift in the tone to one of reassurance 
balanced with disarmament and nonproliferation goals, and this continues through the 
beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969 and the entry into 
force of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970.  
A. INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION: 1949–1962 
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, makes no reference to atomic 
or nuclear weapons. Article 5 does, however, allow each ally to take such “action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security 
of the North Atlantic area.”153 Following the first meeting of NATO later that year, the 
official communiqué emphasized the objective of NATO being to “preserve the heritage 
of freedom and to defend themselves against aggression while emphasizing the desire to 
live in peace with all governments and all peoples.”154 The messages of these infant years 
focus on “the urgent need to strengthen collective defense.”155 Although there is no 
specific mention of nuclear weapons, the May 1950 communiqué calls for “balanced 
collective forces,” which should be “equipped with modern weapons.”156 This reference 
clearly alludes to the NATO force structure in which the main contributions of the U.S. 
would be Strategic Air Power and nuclear weapons and the European nations would 
contribute the bulk of the ground forces.
157
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The message from NATO reflects early perceptions of the best use of the atomic 
bomb. General Curtis Lemay, first leader of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
viewed the bomb as a more robust means of carrying out strategic bombing campaigns 
similar to those of World War II.
158
 The idea of the nuclear bomb as merely a more 
capable weapon quickly dissolved with the realization of the “super” bomb. The 
development of the hydrogen bomb solidified the thought that nuclear weapons could no 
longer be viewed as an augmentation to conventional forces, but required a strategy of 
their own. Along with the U.S. detonation of the first thermonuclear device with the Ivy 
Mike Test, 1952 saw the United Kingdom become the third nation to test a nuclear 
device. Not to be outdone by the U.S. advancements and UK membership in the nuclear 
club, the Soviets detonated a thermonuclear device of their own in 1953.
159
NATO 
communiqués reflected the changing strategic environment with the first mention of 
nuclear weapons in December 1953. In this communiqué, Chairman G. Bidault 
announced the dual goals of “developing and expediting the peaceful use of atomic 
energy and bringing together the Powers principally involved in order to seek a solution 
to the problem of atomic armaments.”160 Later in the statement Bidault graciously 
acknowledged President Eisenhower for asking “Congress for authority to provide 
information on nuclear weapons to NATO Commanders for purposes of NATO military 
planning.”161  
These statements had many implications about the early nuclear age. First, the 
mention of peaceful use and armaments in the same breath indicates efforts by the 
Alliance to paint atomic technology as both a security issue and a technical marvel to be 
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exploited for the benefit of mankind. Leaders acknowledged that many still feared the 
potential of “the bomb” and needed to be shown that the atomic age was also a time for 
advancing society. The second part of the communiqué shows the dominance of the U.S. 
in any nuclear discussion, and represents the need for the leaders of Alliance states to 
take part in NATO’s nuclear strategy. The challenge of creating a nuclear alliance in 
which the burden of nuclear weapons was truly shared, was a major theme during this 
phase of NATO’s development and one that presently remains a topic of debate.162 
The 1954 NATO communiqués made no mention of nuclear weapons; however, 
significant developments in 1955 reasserted the centrality of arms in NATO public 
diplomacy. Following a miraculous 10-year economic recovery from the devastation of 
the Second World War, West Germany became a full member of NATO in May 1955. In 
accordance with the London and Paris Pacts of 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany 
also embarked on the formation of the Bundeswehr. This development, along with the 




The Soviet Union vehemently opposed the establishment of the Bundeswehr and 
responded with the founding of the Warsaw Pact a week after West Germany joined 
NATO. Despite this hardening of the divide between East and West Europe, the Geneva 
Summit of 1955 did offer “genuine détente between the East and West.”164 Both 
Eisenhower and Khrushchev recognized that the development of hydrogen weapons 
furthered convictions that war was an undesirable outcome for all involved, and they 
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The NATO message following the Geneva Summit clearly indicated suspicion of 
any Soviet expression of good will. In a September 1955 speech, Lord Ismay, Secretary 
General of NATO, warned against the ideas that “the development of nuclear weapons 
has rendered conventional forces obsolete” and made “war impossible because it is so 
deadly that both sides would be annihilated.”166 Rather the NATO leader noted the 
“danger that the free peoples may be lulled into a sense of false security, and that they 
will succumb to the temptation to relax their efforts which are still essential, if peace is to 
be preserved.”167 Ismay’s speech touched on two themes that would dominate NATO’s 
public diplomacy regarding nuclear weapons in the coming years. First, the balance 
between conventional forces and nuclear forces was a central issue in the message 
presented to the public. Second, suspicion of Soviet peace efforts became a prominent 
feature of public diplomacy for the next five years.  
The following year the Committee of Three was set up to take a more holistic 
approach to the Alliance and wasted no time in addressing mistrust of Soviet public 
diplomacy. Although the committee was designed to address non-defense issues in 
NATO, its first message linked the threat of nuclear war to the development of 
democratic nations:  
In a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer 
association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other 
than defence purposes alone; …common cultural traditions, free 
institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and 
were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things 
which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for 
their defence but for their development.
168
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The Committee of Three also noted the importance of developing “progress in education 
and public understanding.”169 Undoubtedly this understanding referenced the necessity of 
fostering public support for NATO policies. This first Committee address noted the 
“increased Soviet emphasis on non-military or paramilitary methods,” and called for a 
review “of NATO’s ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the 
guise of coexistence.”170 In an effort to meet this challenge the Committee called for 
increased coordination and development of national information services to counter anti-
NATO propaganda. This communiqué not only called on Alliance states to increase their 
own public communication campaigns, but served as a medium of public diplomacy 
itself. By noting the duplicity of the Soviet information operations, the communiqué 
sought to garner public support for NATO and heighten the urgency with which citizens 
viewed the ideological struggle. NATO public communications in the following years 




Lord Ismay and Chairman Martino’s May 1957 communiqué called Soviet 
messages of peaceful coexistence and disarmament an effort “to ensure for Soviet forces 
a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent.”172 In the same message, the 
NATO leaders also emphasized “the need for NATO to retain an effective deterrent 
against aggression, including a powerful shield of land, sea and air forces, to protect the 
territory of member states.”173  
The October 1957 launch of Sputnik rocked efforts to combat the Soviet 
information campaign. Although Sputnik demonstrated Soviet technological 
achievement, it also forced the warnings of the NATO communiqués to be taken more 
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seriously. P.H. Spaak, then the NATO Secretary General, immediately launched a public 
diplomacy campaign with addresses to the Imperial Defense College, the Overseas Press 
Club of New York, and a joint session of the British Parliament and House of Commons 
between 1 and 6 November. 
174
 
In his speech to the Imperial Defense College, Spaak described the Soviet forces 
as “on a war footing.”175 This circumstance required NATO to “maintain our forces at 
that level of effectiveness which our commanders consider essential to meet that threat, 
and equip them with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.”176 Spaak repeated this call 
in his speech to the Overseas Press Club when he called for “the modernisation of all 
NATO forces,”177 and “development of certain specific weapons, particularly in the field 
of missiles, and to provide nuclear power for our forces in Europe.”178 Before Parliament 
and the House of Commons the NATO leader again declared it “absolutely essential that 
we give our forces tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.”179 Spaak’s efforts to address 
the fear provoked by Sputnik had a second message alongside the call for increased 
nuclear capabilities of NATO forces. 
The second message in Spaak’s post-Sputnik speeches highlights the difference 
between the NATO and Soviet approaches to defense spending, specifically the refusal of 
the West to compromise standards of living for defense industry. In a notable 
comparison, Spaak stated, “We cannot choose between Sputnik and the washing 
machine. We must make them both, and we can only make them both if in the Free 
World as a whole we co-ordinate our efforts to the fullest possible extent.”180 Spaak again 
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noted the choice between the washing machine and Sputnik, or more broadly, between 
security and prosperity, in his speech to the House of Commons and Parliament.
181
 By 
linking the ideological values of the West with the technological and military 
requirements of the Alliance, NATO’s nuclear strategy was portrayed as an extension of 
the citizens’ economic freedom and well-being. Although the Alliance acknowledged 
Sputnik as a significant achievement, the public message focused on the fundamental 
differences between Soviet and NATO motivations and means for enhancing military 
capabilities. Technological advancements in the Alliance would be for the benefit, rather 
than to the detriment, of the citizens. 
The message linking the ideological struggle to technological advancements, vis-
á-vis nuclear weapons, was encapsulated in the communiqué following the Paris Summit 
in December 1957 in which NATO denounced “Soviet tactics of alternating between 
peace propaganda statements and attempted intimidation by the threat of nuclear 
attack.”182 Spaak declared the Soviet idea of peaceful coexistence as a propaganda 
strategy designed to encourage Europeans to “renounce nuclear weapons and missiles 
and rely on arms of the preatomic age.”183 Furthermore, due to the Soviet actions, “the 
Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at 
the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.”184 
The May 1958 communiqué had a slight change of tone with a discussion of steps 
toward disarmament, starting with “studies and experiments on the technical problems of 
inspection and control,” but such efforts thus far were pursued “in spite of repeated 
Soviet refusal.”185 The more dominant theme as the Cold War entered the 1960s was the 
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rejection of the Soviet “formula of ‘peaceful co-existence’ under cover of which attacks 
continue to be made on individual members of the Alliance.”186 Again in the Final 
Communiqué of 1961 the Allies noted that “The Soviet Union, while professing to 
negotiate in good faith, must for many months past have been secretly preparing the 
longest series of nuclear tests yet carried out, culminating in the largest nuclear explosion 
yet known.”187 
By and large, the first decade of communiqués reflect a “recognition that NATO 
was on trial before a global audience comprised of potential enemies, as well as potential 
allies,”188 In order to effectively reach the goal of integrated defense centered around 
nuclear weapons, the communiqués balanced discussions of this technology with “broad 
based appeal to higher values,”189 such as the messages from the Committee of Three and 
the sputnik versus washing machine illustration. In doing so, NATO squared the circle of 
garnering support from a war weary public for a strategy reliant on the threat of 
apocalyptic war. As the 1960s came to a close, NATO faced the challenge of 
“maintaining Western unity in the absence of a compelling need to maintain unity.”190 
The NATO communiqués entering the 1960s demonstrate a heightened awareness of the 
ongoing ideological struggle as a means of addressing this challenge. NATO showed 
more concern over the Soviet demonstrations of technological might, such as Sputnik, 
atmospheric testing, and ballistic missile development, than the words coming from the 
Kremlin. The possibility of arms control was discussed, but only as an opportunity to 
show Soviet duplicity. The nature of the North Atlantic Community and the public 
diplomacy landscape continued to evolve when brinksmanship truly reached the breaking 
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point in October 1962. The Soviet gamble in Cuba brought the possibility of nuclear war 
closer to reality than at any other time, and the tone of NATO communiqués reflected this 
change starting in December 1962.
191
 
B. BACK FROM THE ABYSS: NATO COMMUNIQUÉS 1963–1970 
The December 1962 communiqué noted that disaster was avoided only by the 
“the firmness and restraint of the United States, supported by the Alliance and other free 
nations.”192 However, with this near miss came a growing desire for increased sharing of 
information and decision making regarding nuclear weapons, as well as an emphasis on 
limiting the escalating arms race.  
The May 1963 communiqué highlighted the steps taken to organize nuclear 
forces, including “broader participation by officers of NATO member countries” and 
“fuller information to national authorities, both political and military.”193 Again in 
December 1963 the only mention of nuclear weapons noted decisions “regarding fuller 
information on nuclear questions for national authorities and broader participation by 
member countries in the organization and operational planning functions of SACEUR’s 
nuclear forces.”194 These efforts resulted in the establishment of the Nuclear Defense 
Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. The reports from the  
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NPG in 1967 and 1968 focused on the adequacy of the current state of NATO nuclear 
forces, a distinct change from earlier NATO communiqués which called for additional 
nuclear forces in the NATO structure.
195
 
The second theme to take precedence in the post-Cuban missile crisis period was 
increased attention to disarmament and limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Although these topics received limited attention prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, they 
became prominent during the 1960s. In the December 1964 Communiqué, D. U. Strikker 
noted the “efforts to arrive at agreements in the field of disarmament,” and “the 
importance of avoiding the dissemination of nuclear weapons.”196 In May 1965, the only 
mention of nuclear arms was in the context of the “press for active negotiations to 
achieve measures of disarmament under effective international control” and the 
importance of “preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”197 This trend continued 
in the 1966 and 1967 communiqués, and in 1968, M. Brosio went so far as to endorse  
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“the hope expressed by Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group that progress could be 
made in discussions with the Soviet Union towards a limitation of the strategic nuclear 
arms race.”198  
As the 1960s came to a close, the majority of references to nuclear arms were in 
the context of disarmament and quelling the escalating arms race. Communiqués 
reflected an acceptance of NATO’s nuclear forces and focused instead on easing 
tensions. Rather than paint the picture of an enemy, Soviet actions such as those in Berlin 
in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were allowed to speak for themselves. The change 
in focus of public diplomacy reflected a changing international environment in which the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, The Non-Proliferation Treaty, and an age of détente 
would be possible entering the 1970s. 
C. NATO COMMUNIQUÉS AS PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS OF NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY 
The early years of the Atomic Era coincided with a communications revolution 
with radio and television broadcasts reaching larger audiences worldwide. With the 
communications revolution, came an increased emphasis on public diplomacy, 
continuing a trend from the 19th century in which the opinion of the democratic masses 
had increasing importance on the formation of strategy. Following the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, there was a distinct shift in NATO’s presentation of nuclear issues to the public. 
Members of the Alliance continued to require the assurance of the ultimate security 
guarantee, but demanded more information and influence over nuclear strategy.199  
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These demands still exist in NATO today. The reshaping of the Alliance 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure to prevent the atrocities in the 
Balkans in the 1990s, and the tensions arising following 9/11 and the economic crisis of 
the late 2000s have all shifted the focus on NATO away from nuclear weapons. However, 
as NATO continues to grow into the 21st century, nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate 
guarantee of sovereignty, and the presence of nuclear weapons, albeit technologically 
dated, in member states holds tremendous geopolitical importance and serve to reassure 
Allies of the United States commitment to Article Five of the Treaty. The presentations 
of NATO nuclear strategy to the public will remain important in determining the future 
importance of the Alliance.  
NATO communiqués will continue to serve as a unified message to citizens and 
leaders of Allies and adversary nations, and they must continue to walk the line between 
assurance and deterrence. These messages offer insight to the strategic mindset of NATO 
leaders and serve to gain public support in an era of challenging fiscal change. One 
potential threat to the NATO deterrent is the strength of the nuclear taboo, developed 
over time “in part against the preference of the United States.”200 This taboo can be seen 
as both beneficial and detrimental to NATO security aims. On the one hand, stigmatizing 
nuclear weapons furthers the aims of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and legitimizes 
efforts to punish those seeking nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the taboo places 
international pressure on members of the nuclear club to take steps to show good faith in 
decreasing nuclear arsenals in accordance with Article Six of the NPT.201 Such pressures 
are increased when leaders make bold statements, such as those by President Obama in 
Prague in 2009 when he iterated “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security  
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of a world without nuclear weapons.”202 Although President Obama hedged this by 
noting the long timeline of such a goal, such statements nonetheless place tension on the 
fabric that binds NATO. 
Another challenge to the NATO deterrent is the ambivalence of many people 
toward the role of nuclear weapons. During the Atomic Age, nuclear issues remained at 
the center of public debate. Citizens of the West lived in the shadow of the bomb and 
discussions of nuclear strategy and nuclear war were an important aspect of public 
discourse where experts devoted significant time to studying current issues and debates 
on the topic. The topic was pushed to the periphery during the second half of the cold 
war, despite the arms race’s continued buildup into the 1980s. This trend has the potential 
to create a world of leaders devoid of critical thought on issues of nuclear deterrence. 
Although considering all contingencies is an impossible task, such an important aspect of 
international security should not go unconsidered and the nuclear debate cannot be 
relegated strictly to the pursuit of non-proliferation and disarmament goals.203 
The Second Nuclear Age has created a “more complex nuclear geometry”204 in 
which proliferation has spread to North Korea and likely will spread to Iran in the not so 
distant future. In this environment, “the rationale advanced for nuclear deterrence by 
governments may have decisive role in sustaining such policies- or undermining 
them.”205 In order to ensure NATO and the U.S. maintain an appropriate nuclear strategy 
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for possible nuclear threats, leadership must “be increasingly obliged to articulate and 
defend more general security rationales for nuclear capabilities (such as war prevention 
and political stabilization) and to participate in far reaching dialogues regarding the 
ethical, operational, arms control, and international political-order issues associated with 
nuclear deterrence policies.”206 
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V. STRADDLING THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE: WINNING 
NUCLEAR CONFLICT WITH IDEAS 
The unique challenge of the Cold War was balancing an ideological struggle 
between the West and the Soviet Union with the undeniable potential for the most 
extreme violence made possible with the advent of nuclear technology. When seen from 
today’s perspective after more than a decade of irregular conflict and a deteriorating 
international system, this technology has proven to be the ultimate guarantee of 
sovereignty and security, however, throughout its history policy makers have been award 
that use of the bomb would require “skilful propaganda and political measures”207 in 
order to avoid the counterproductive results of neutralism, pacifism or outright surrender. 
As demonstrated by the U.S., Soviet, and NATO, attempts discussed in this thesis, there 
are various ways to influence public opinion in such an environment. In each example 
state leadership sought to shape citizens’ views on warfare during the early atomic era in 
order to garner the support necessary to carry out an expensive strategy which required a 
tremendous amount of faith from the increasingly important political masses. 
A. MOBILIZING THE MASSES: PUBLIC OPINION AND STRATEGY 
In the West, the desired public opinion was conceived from the 200-year process 
of development of Michael Howard’s liberal conscience and its relation to the political 
nature of war in pluralistic politics.208 Howard offers an explanation for this seemingly 
incongruous balance between the ideological support for freedom and democracy and the 
threat of catastrophic war. In his landmark piece of the late Vietnam era, War and the 
Liberal Conscience, Howard posits that American liberal conscience of the 1950s “could 
understand and support either a just war or a perpetual peace, and it appreciated that the 
former might be necessary to achieve the latter.” Furthermore, “It had no time for any 
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shifts or manoeuvres, any deals or compromises, that might lie between the two.”209 The 
examples of propaganda and public diplomacy in this thesis present a world constantly 
teetering between these two poles.  
The images from the official mass persuasion of The Big Picture and other 
programs from the era show a nation ready to wage war, but always in “the framework of 
a new world of peace under law.”210 Episodes such as “The Common Defense” and “The 
Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield” present the military as “the posse comitatus, 
enforcing the rule of law against the malefactors and their associates.”211 From this 
perspective, the landscape of the early atomic age is truly the culmination of a “story of 
the efforts of good men to abolish war but only succeeding in making it more terrible.”212 
That is, more or less in conformity with the liberal conscience, and not in some wrong-
headed glorification of war, violence and warriors unhinged from state and law. U.S. 
citizen embraced the need for vigilance and militarization due to a collective liberal 
identity in which freedom and democracy were values worth sacrificing especially in the 
face of a totalitarian enemy.  
Another, quite different perspective of the role of the citizen in warfare comes 
from Carl Schmitt. In The Concept of the Political, violence and politics are one in the 
same. At the heart of man’s existence is the political entity, the state, which, “as an 
essentially political entity belongs the jus belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a 
concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating 
from the entity.”213 The state is formed by people consenting to fight and to die for its 
existence, and therefore has the authority to “demand from its own members the 
readiness to die and unhesitatingly kill enemies.”214 This perspective rationalizes the 
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propaganda of the nuclear era as a means to prepare citizens for such an outcome. It 
hardly needs to be said that Schmitt later became a Nazi, and his point of view was 
intensely anti liberal, anti-American, and totalitarian.  
B. THE VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE 
Although the world of today does not hold the clear lines of demarcation as the 
Cold War era with focuses being on non-state actors, counterinsurgency operations, and 
next generation warfare, one should not look back on this era with too much nostalgia. 
Russia remains the most capable nuclear state other than the Unite States. An assessment 
of the historic tendency of the strategic communication efforts of the world’s second 
largest nuclear power offers value to the current strategic context. The strategic deception 
campaign and complimentary Peace Offensive of the 1950s and 1960s put Soviet Russia 
in a position to attempt a daring move in 1962 which, fortunately, was resolved without 
violence. The potential for similar miscalculations and miscommunications, fueled by 
propaganda and inconsistent public diplomacy, remain a grave threat to geopolitical 
stability.  
Furthermore, historic ambitions for great power status and a quest for strategic 
parity do not disappear overnight. The motives behind the most recent Russian escapades 
in Crimea are open to considerable debate, but the military action is undoubtedly being 
coupled with a propaganda and public diplomacy campaign seeking to shape world 
opinion in support of an outcome favorable to the Kremlin. Despite the differences 
between Vladimir Putin and his Soviet counterparts of the 1950s and 1960s, strategic 
communications from Moscow will continue to target geo-political objectives and should 
be viewed alongside Russian actions in both current and historic contexts. 
C. IDEOLOGY AND THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE 
It is only fitting that two seemingly incongruous ideologies are, to some degree, 
both compatible with a strategy for a war based on ideas while at the same time 
constantly under the shadow of the ultimate weapon. One factor allowing this was that 
the perceived sacrifice people were being asked to make was minimized by an 
exaggerated faith, cultivated by strategic leaders, in the promise of new technology. This 
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concept will be discussed further below. Another explanation can be found in Clausewitz 
to the extent that this theorist understood best the relationship among the factors of war in 
fact, anger, hatred, political effect and reason. 
The idea of influencing the emotional aspect of a nation strikes most clearly on 
one aspect of Clausewitz’s much discussed remarkable trinity which is found at the end 
of the first chapter of the first book of On War. Although typically distilled to be the 
people, the military, and the government, links made explicitly by Clausewitz, one should 
still note his original reference to the trinity: 
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a 
paradoxical trinity- composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, 
which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play and chance 
and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its 
element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it 
subject to reason alone.215 
Propaganda and public diplomacy clearly appeal to the emotional aspect of the 
trinity, the people, however these tools to not do so exclusively. Both the Soviet Peace 
Offensive and the NATO communiqués were produced by the government with the goal 
of mass persuasion in mind. The majority of the television programs examined came 
from the military. In the case of the Soviet and U.S. information campaigns, the people 
were the target but also the source of military energy in the epoch of total war, all 
machines notwithstanding. The NATO communiqués on the other hand, were directed at 
both citizens and government leaders. Furthermore, in democratic societies the 
citizenship plays an important role in shaping the actions of the other two aspects of the 
Trinity. Essentially propaganda cannot be isolated as a method to invoke an emotional 
response and pander solely to the “primordial violence” noted above, because the 
influence of the masses cannot be isolated to a single pillar of the trinity.216 
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On any measureable continuum of conflict, at one end lies total and absolute war, 
in which goals of annihilation of the enemy reign supreme, and at the other extreme is 
political struggle without violence.217 The spectrum of violence, outlined in the highest 
echelon of U.S. military doctrine, Joint Publication One (JP-1), has its roots in 
Clausewitz and the experience of the U.S. armed forces with the problem of limited and 
irregular conflict in contrast to total war and a strategy of annihilation. The theorist 
astutely noted: “War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable 
in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy.”218 The levels of war in 
JP-1 attempt to quantify these pulsations. Furthermore, perceptions of war also influence 
the level of violence, and vice-versa. Again Clausewitz offers further explanation: 
The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect 
the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the 
outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more 
important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the 
military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more 
military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less 
intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to 
violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven 
further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more 
at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem 
increasingly political in character.219 
The ideological struggle of the Cold War inflamed the passions of citizens in the United 
States to vilify the Soviet menace and the military prepared to wage and win a conflict 
engulfed in unprecedented violence, yet on the other hand neither party desired to enter 
into war in its natural state nor was it practical policy to annihilate the USSR in a manner 
which would have invited the nuclear destruction of the United States in turn. 
The importance of public diplomacy, propaganda, psychological warfare, or any 
other term associated with the utilization of ideas as weapons plays a changing role as 
one travels along this spectrum of violence. One perspective places the importance of 
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such tools as inverse to the level of violence present in conflict. Colonel William Darby, 
while discussing the role of Information Operations (IO) from a pseudo Clausewitzian 
perspective, saw the emergence of a pattern in this relationship: 
Conflicts grouped near the total war extreme are uniformly kinetic 
operations clearly claiming the dominant/supported role in relation to IO. 
However, conflicts grouped toward the devoid-of-violence extreme appear 
to have an equally legitimate claim on being the dominant/supported 
activity according to the internal logic of their own particular 
circumstances and place on the continuum of political conflict.220  
The examples presented in the previous chapters demonstrate a unique 
characteristic of Cold War as a primarily political struggle, but the potential violence of 
thermonuclear warfare was ever-present in mass persuasion and psychological warfare. 
D. TECHNOLOGY OR STRATEGY: CHALLENGES IN THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF WARFARE 
The threat of thermonuclear war in 1950s and 1960s was accompanied by a 
narrative focused on preparing citizens for the horrors of thermonuclear war. At the same 
time, nuclear deterrence developed as a concept based on war avoidance. The disconnect 
between war in reality and war in theory, and the preference, the striving, and the hope, 
for cleaner victory without the loss of life came to dominate strategy. This dichotomy 
arose from strategic culture, i.e. the US fascination with technology as a neutralization in 
the sense of Carl Schmitt, as well as some more or less coherent attempt to give a purpose 
to violence that had exceeded coherent political ends. At the center of such thought has 
been an over-reliance on technology and, in some instances, a substitution of technology 
for strategy and a lack of historical context or for the reasons outlined above that arise 
from domestic politics, culture, and ideas. The oft-repeated theme in episodes of The Big 
Picture was the technological marvel and superiority of the U.S. military which reflected  
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the experience of the second world war in part, where, the U.S. side had really not been 
as technologically superior as it had wanted, but caught up nonetheless and had the 
ultimate weapon of the A bomb.  
Implicit in such praise is the suggestion that technology the solution to all military 
challenges as well as the technocratic negation of the inherent political and violent nature 
of war which, at times, is too awful for the liberal conscience to confront. Currently, in 
the year 2014 as this thesis is being written, drones and “cyberwarriors” are emerging 
technologies that adherents of the technological imperative in war- believe present a 
relatively cheap way to fight war and render it a coherent instrument of policy and to 
reduce the blood and mess that are, always and forever, at its core. However, in reality 
these are merely means for shaping the execution of war. Neo Clausewitzian Hugh 
Strachan notes that “the conditioning influences in shaping strategy,” in alignment with 
traditional thought on warfare, “have been less technological and more social, political 
and historical.”221 These technologies are minor in their impact when compared to the 
technology of the atomic bomb and, more importantly have the same shortcomings as a 
solution to military problems as had by the bomb in the far off mid-20th century. Bernard 
Brodie, a further adherent of Clausewitz astutely noted that the atom bomb was no 
substitute for policy, and his observation remains valid to temper contemporary 
technological leaps of faith: “It underlines the urgency of our reaching correct decisions, 
but it does not help us to discover which decisions are in fact correct.”222 
Determining a coherent strategy and policy in a democratic state and society is a 
unique challenge for the emotions of the population must both be reflected in the policy 
and checked to support often hard to define long term interests. In the high Atomic Age 
ca 1958, the messages presented to the public were, equally, if not more, important than 
the actual technology used to implement strategy, and often “The difference between 
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expert opinions and popular rhetoric was not always very great.”223 The image of children 
ducking beneath school desks at a moment’s notice, the modern troops in The Big Picture 
prepared to fight in the aftermath of nuclear artillery blasts, bodacious atmospheric 
testing, and Secretary General Spaak’s memorable decree about choosing sputnik and the 
washing machine all serve as examples of efforts to shape the emotions of the masses in 
the shadow of the bomb and further embodied the best efforts of the liberal conscience in 
a period of crisis to master the ends and means of war without the latter suffocating 
everything as it threatened to do on an hourly basis.  
These efforts should not be regarded by critics as attempts by “glorifiers of 
violence”224 to manipulate populations. Rather the propaganda and portrayal of nuclear 
war to the masses demonstrate a quality intrinsic in the Cold War in which “numbers and 
capabilities of weapons were important, but not nearly as important as the fears and 
hopes that existed in people’s minds.”225 That is, to say, a recognition by strategists of 
the role of anger, hatred, political purpose, chance, and the people in war in fact, versus 
the partisan political misuse of false martial virtues and technological obsession as a 
substitute for strategy by tacticians and militarists. This idea must not be relegated to the 
Cold War as it is more or less timeless. Although the specific objects of peoples’ hopes 
and fears differ in contemporary society from those of the Cold War West, it is the 
emotions and perceptions of the friend-foe dynamic from which violence and warfare 
arise. In order to gain a greater understanding of the nature of war, one would be remiss 
to overlook the narrative presented to the masses and the importance of citizens’ 
perceptions of warfare and those who must bear its awful but necessary burdens.  
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